

UNCLASSIFIED//



Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFA-AT)
in Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW))

13 May 2013

UNCLASSIFIED//

[illegible]

(U) [REDACTED] Cover photo: Marines from an Afghan Border Police SFA-AT confer with an Afghan counterpart.

Executive Summary

(U//) **PURPOSE:** To document security force assistance advisor team (SFA-AT) efforts within Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)); to inform Deputy Commandants (DC) Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA); Aviation (AVN); Combat Development and Integration (CD&I); Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O); Installations and Logistics (I&L); and Programs and Resources (P&R); Commanding General (CG) Training and Education Command (TECOM); Director of Intelligence; operating forces; and others of related lessons, observations, and recommendations. the MCCLL Program Analyst (PA) assigned to RC (SW) conducted a collection within the RC (SW) area of operations (AO); the methodology included one-on-one interviews, questionnaires, and review of pertinent source documents, directives, and available quantitative data. Key staff from RC (SW), Task Force Leatherneck (TFL), Task Force Helmand (TFH), Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW), Regimental Combat Team-7 (RCT-7), Combat Logistics Regiment-15 (CLR-15), and other units, as well as personnel assigned to 15 different SFA-ATs, were interviewed.

Bottom Line Up Front

(U//) The Marine Corps has conducted SFA in Afghanistan in some form since at least 2006. Per the security transition framework agreed upon at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, recent International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts have focused on the transition from partnering, advise and assist operations to SFA. Partnering was conducted in four phases: assessment, training and coalition led combined operations, Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) led operations, and, finally, independent Afghan operations with coalition forces in over-watch. Reflected in those phases is the transition from partnering to advising. At the time of this collection, over 800 personnel served on 31 Marine and 13 British SFA-ATs within RC (SW) across the spectrum of ANSF units from the regional/corps to district/kandak levels. As the general drawdown continues and ANSF capabilities improve, the number of SFA-ATs will decline accordingly.

(U//) Advising occurs in a complex environment reflecting myriad cultural, political, bureaucratic, operational, and interpersonal pressures. Most impactful is the fundamental nature of the advisor-counterpart relationship: in the absence of any form of command authority, an advisor's influence is often limited. Consequently, strong personal relationships and the coercive leverage exerted through control of key enablers are essential. The general characteristics and personal qualities of effective advisors include solid tactical and technical skills; patience and maturity; and the capacity to establish rapport with counterparts. Advising is challenged by limitations imposed by operational security (OPSEC) requirements; force protection considerations; and the impact of pervasive cultural factors.¹

(U//) Interviewees agreed that fundamental infantry skills (e.g., marksmanship, weapons maintenance, patrolling skills, post standing, and basic discipline) are critical to any ANSF unit's success. Beyond these basic capabilities, an effective unit must have strong leadership and the capacity to plan, execute, and sustain independent operations. Conversely, weak units are often distinguished by poor weapon handling skills, limited patrolling and post standing, unit defeat in combat engagement, and the inability to coordinate offensive operations. Personnel and equipment accountability, administration (i.e., pay and leave), and general maintenance also are fundamental indicators of proficiency. Unit capability is generally reflective of leadership, unit cohesion, and threat level. Although there are exceptions, many Afghan units are challenged by excessive centralized

control that reflects officer driven organizations and a general lack of trust and confidence in non-commissioned officers (NCO), low rates of literacy, and exceptionally weak logistical processes and support.²

(U// [REDACTED]) Until March 2013, the C10 was the RC (SW) staff section with primary responsibility for ANSF development. In recognition of ANSF development as a whole of staff undertaking, coincident with the relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (MEF (Fwd)) by II MEF (Fwd), the C10 section was stood down and its functions distributed across the entire staff.³

Key Points

(U// [REDACTED]) As described by the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), an SFA-AT's three primary responsibilities are: (1) training, (2) advise and assist, and (3) assessment.⁴ [REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED]) Although specific advisor team structure varies by type and size of ANSF unit advised, teams typically include the following billets or functions: team leader/senior advisor, assistant team leader, senior enlisted advisor, administration, intelligence, operations, training, logistics, medical, and communications.⁶ Advisor teams range in size from around a dozen personnel to nearly three times that number for the large brigade teams.

(U// [REDACTED]) Manning requirements are constantly evolving in light of changes on the battlefield and emerging ANSF requirements. Consequently, given the long lead time associated with manning and training, SFA-AT manning documents must be reviewed and amended routinely.⁷ [REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED]) The typical pre-deployment training program (PTP) continuum is approximately 140 days. Basic individual and team Block I-III (~70 days) training is conducted by the parent unit and MEF-level Advisor Training Centers (ATC); Block IV (~29 days) is the purview of the Advisor Training Group (ATG) at Twenty-nine Palms, California and culminates with assessment and an extensive mission rehearsal exercise (MRX); PTP concludes with a two week long remediation period, leave, and embarkation and deployment preparation (~30 days) followed by in-country training including advanced marksmanship training.¹⁰

(U//) The ATG's systems approach to Block IV assessment and training emphasizes: rapport building; combined operations planning; mounted and dismounted tactical operations; counterinsurgency (COIN) operations; police operations, site exploitation, and detainee handling; integration of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a whole of government approach; and ANSF assessment techniques. Training includes live-fire foreign weapons training and the motorized patrol course; counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) training (Attack the Network and Defeat the Network) is integrated into all events. All training is supported by the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) and a large cadre of host nation (HN) role players.

(U//) The general consensus of brigade-level and below SFA-ATs was that the top three ATG PTP vignettes were: cultural immersion, convoy operations, and CIED.¹¹ Interviewees noted that given the presence of embedded interpreters, less language training is necessary; moreover, they stressed the importance of cultural awareness and understanding and suggested more such training.¹² For brigade level SFA-ATs and above, additional instruction in combat operations center (COC) and staff development was recommended.¹³

(U//) A seamless RIP/TOA is necessary for continuity and to reassure ANSF counterparts; extensive left seat/right seat activities and a concrete training plan are instrumental to this end.¹⁴ Although very few USMC advisors have the opportunity to conduct pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS), those that did emphasized their important contribution to situational awareness.¹⁵ Conversely,

(U//) An advisor's influence is constrained to some degree by his capacity to provide essential support; the so-called 'leverage' resident in the capacity to withhold support is an important coercive tool. Advisors should make provision of enablers (e.g., quick reaction force (QRF), fires, air support, and logistics) at least partly contingent on cooperation.

(U//) the 707 Zone Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) Senior Advisor, expressed succinctly the challenge confronting all SFA-ATs: "Force protection is the first and primary concern."¹⁸ Advisors must be acutely sensitive to anything abnormal (i.e., out of the ordinary) and immediately bring concerns to the attention of senior ANSF leaders.¹⁹ While some interviewees supported a "distancing" approach, others stressed the importance of establishing and maintaining close relations.²⁰ RCT-7's ANSF Cell Officer-in-Charge (OIC), observed: "Dealing with the insider threat is counterintuitive... You need to get closer ...talk to them more ...and you need to be in proximity to them."²¹ In this vein, stressed the importance of strong personal relationships: "If an Afghan commander...values his partnership with coalition forces, he's going to go out of his way to protect [them]."²² For SFA-ATs operating in isolated areas with high threat levels, reinforcement with force protection personnel from supporting battle space owners (BSO) is vital.

(U//) Interviewees emphasized the absolute primacy of cultural awareness. Commenting on the impact of generally sharp cultural differences and profoundly different perspectives on corruption, RC (SW)'s ANA Lead, observed: "We still want to impose idealistic western ideals...and we shouldn't because they're just not relevant to the Afghans."²³

(U//) Attrition within ANSF units is exceedingly high. Consequently, basic training is continuous for all units; train the trainer (T3) packages are instrumental to developing and maintaining basic skills and an organic training capacity.²⁶

(U//) As noted above, ANSF units are characterized by extremely centralized command and control (C2); commenting on the phenomena, the Senior Advisor to the 1st Brigade, 215th Corps, observed that, "command and control is done by commanding officer to commanding officer [e.g.,] brigade commander to kandak commander; ...the staffs are very ineffective without their leader's decision or blessing on a project."^{27 28} He also noted that, "They rarely use their COC to make decisions or to provide information to a commander."²⁹ Advisors noted that a flexible model for C2 is necessary; in instances where centralized C2 is effective, the SFA-AT may actually reinforce the approach.³⁰

(U//) The ANSF logistics process is characterized as 'push' vice 'pull', that is, materiel is distributed from the national level at Kabul to Helmand on a routine—usually monthly—basis; this methodology complicates the standard Ministry of Defense/Ministry of Interior Form 14 (MOD/MOI-14) request process and, given generally poor accounting practices, yields an inherently inefficient system.^{31 32}

(U//) ANSF preventative and corrective maintenance capabilities are limited and exacerbated by shortages of Class IX repair parts.³³ For ANA units, basic maintenance is provided by Combat Service Support Kandaks (CSSK); for 2d and 3d echelon repairs beyond CSSK capability, vehicles and equipment are inducted into the Regional Logistic Support Center (RLSC) maintenance cycle at Camp Shorabak.³⁴ Afghan National Police vehicle maintenance is largely provided through the Automotive Maintenance Service (AMS) contract facility in Lash'kar Gah.³⁵

(U//) Interpreters for the higher headquarter (HHQ) SFA-ATs (i.e., 215th Corps ANA, 707 Zone AUP, Operational Coordination Center-Regional (OCC-R), Provincial Police Advising Team (PPAT), 5th Brigade Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and 6th Zone Afghan Border Police (ABP) are managed by the RC; all others are managed by the BSOs.³⁶ An important measure of interpreter effectiveness and suitability is the capacity to be accepted and establish rapport with ANSF counterparts. Interpreters are generally young and often fail to show ANSF leaders the requisite deference and respect.³⁷ the Deputy Team Chief with the 215th Corps, observed that local national interpreters are often more effective than foreign or ex-patriot Category I-II interpreters due to their cultural sensitivity and situational awareness.^{38 39}

(U//) Over 400 Embedded Police Mentors (EPM) serve throughout Afghanistan from the provincial to precinct level; EPMs generally advise on evidence-based operations (EBO) (i.e., investigative efforts to collect evidence to build a case). an EPM with the Helmand PPAT, emphasized the continuity of effort often represented by EPMs who may remain with a single ANSF unit for 2-3 years.⁴⁰

(U//) SFA-AT command relationships (COMREL) in RC (SW) are complex and result in C2, administrative, and logistical challenges;

(U//) The OCCs at regional, provincial, and district levels are embryonic capabilities. The district-level OCC-Ds are a non-doctrinal RC (SW) initiative supported by the ANP's Regional Logistics Center (RLC) and not yet reflected in MOI tashkiels.^{41 42}

[REDACTED]

[illegible]

mcell/orr/v7 1.

Table of Contents


| | |
|--|----|
| Executive Summary | 3 |
| Bottom Line Up Front | 3 |
| Key Points | 4 |
| Prologue..... | 10 |
| Background | 11 |
| Definitions..... | 14 |
| Organizations..... | 15 |
| Command Relationships (COMREL) | 18 |
| Operational Coordination Centers | 19 |
| Advisor Teams | 20 |
| Manning..... | 20 |
| Training..... | 22 |
| Equipment..... | 23 |
| Operations..... | 23 |
| Intelligence..... | 25 |
| Security (Force Protection) | 25 |
| Sustainment..... | 26 |
| Personnel and Administration | 26 |
| ANSF Units | 26 |
| Manning..... | 27 |
| Training..... | 27 |
| Operations..... | 28 |
| Intelligence..... | 29 |
| Logistics..... | 29 |
| Medical..... | 31 |
| Personnel and Administration | 31 |

| | |
|--------------------------|----|
| Culture | 31 |
| Assessments | 32 |
| Insider Threat..... | 33 |
| Role of Contractors..... | 34 |
| Best Practices | 35 |
| Summary..... | 35 |
| Recommendations..... | 35 |
| Endnotes..... | 37 |

Prologue

(U) This report is one of many publications addressing a wide array of topics assembled and produced by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. The MCCLL library is not to be considered a sole or authoritative source, and was not designed as such. MCCLL provides a vehicle to inform the operating forces in the queue for subsequent deployments, the DOTMLPF stakeholders, and the advocates of the unvarnished experiences of Marines engaged in operations. Reporting or relaying these experiences may provide the impetus to effect a change in any or all of the DOTMLPF pillars.

(U) MCCLL relies on the individual Marine and commands to provide their hard learned lessons in order to disseminate them throughout the Marine Corps. The goal is to get these knowledge jewels into the MCCLL Lesson Management System in order to disseminate them in such a timely manner as to make them invaluable to the next Marine in the deployment queue.



Director, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned

Background

[REDACTED]

(U) At the request of the RC (SW) Chief of Staff, the MCCLL PA assigned to RC (SW) conducted a collection in order to capture lessons and observations from SFA-AT efforts within RC (SW). The collection was conducted November 2012 to January 2013 at locations throughout the RC (SW) AO; the methodology included one-on-one interviews, questionnaires, and review of pertinent source documents, directives, and available quantitative data. Key staff from RC (SW), TFL, TFH, TFBW, RCT-7, CLR-15, and other units, as well as personnel assigned to 15 different SFA-ATs, were interviewed.

(U// [REDACTED]) MCCLL has reported on Marine Corps security force assistance efforts several times in the last five years. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED]) The Marine Corps has conducted SFA in Afghanistan in some form since at least 2006. Per the security transition framework agreed upon at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, recent coalition efforts have focused on the transition from partnering, advise and assist operations to SFA. Partnering was conducted in four phases: assessment, training and coalition-led combined operations, ANSF led operations, and, finally, independent Afghan operations with coalition forces in over-watch. Reflected in those phases is the transition from partnering to advising. At the time of this collection, over 800 personnel served on 31 Marine and 13 British SFA-ATs within RC (SW) across the spectrum of ANSF units from the regional/corps to district/kandak levels. As the general drawdown continues and ANSF capabilities improve, the number of SFA-ATs will decline accordingly.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

Consequently, to simplify the discussion, where appropriate, advisor teams are addressed herein in general terms; where required, however, specific examples are given to demonstrate issues unique to



(U) Figure 1: A Marine advisor instructs ANA soldiers on the use of a global positioning system when locating positions in Kunder, Helmand province 11 May 2012.

one type of SFA-AT or another. Moreover, after nearly 12 years, OEF is a mature, complex undertaking; similarly, OEF SFA efforts are intricate and characterized by an abundance—even by military standards—of unique terminology and acronyms that are constantly evolving. Therefore, sections describing key terms and organizations are provided early in the report.

(U// [REDACTED] [REDACTED])
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Although the focus of USMC and RC (SW) advising efforts is at the ANSF unit and headquarter level, active advising occurs throughout Afghanistan within the various GfRoA ministries. [REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED]) Advising occurs in a complex environment reflecting myriad cultural, political, bureaucratic, operational, and interpersonal pressures. Most impactful is the fundamental nature of the advisor-





counterpart relationship: in the absence of any form of command authority, an advisor's influence is often limited. Consequently, strong personal relationships and the coercive leverage exerted through control of key enablers are essential. The general characteristics and personal qualities of effective advisors include solid tactical and technical skills; patience and maturity; and the capacity to establish rapport with counterparts. Advising is challenged by limitations imposed by OPSEC requirements; force protection considerations; and the impact of pervasive cultural factors.⁵⁶









- 
- 
- 
- 

Definitions

(U//) Key terms:

- **Advising:** The use of influence to teach, coach, and advise while working alongside, with, and through the ANSF unit.⁶⁷
- **Advisor Team (AT):** A task organized unit “that consists of leadership and subject matter experts, co-located with or in close proximity to an ANSF unit.”⁶⁸
- **Cipher:** A formal Afghan order or tasking.
- **Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT):** Combining objective and subjective elements, the CUAT is the primary methodology for measuring and reporting the capabilities of ANSF units.⁶⁹ The CUAT and assessments in general are addressed more fully in the “Assessments” section.
- **Embedded Police Mentor (EPM):** EPMs are experienced police officers serving with ANP units; they include contracted professionals , UK and Danish civilian police, and UK MOD police.⁷⁰ There are over 400 EPMs throughout Afghanistan from the provincial to precinct level. Law enforcement professionals (LEP) on the other hand are police officers assigned at the RC (SW) and battalion levels and focused generally on policy issues; unlike EPMs, LEPs are specifically prohibited from advising Afghans.⁷¹
- **Enablers:** In the context of advisor teams, enablers refer to those personnel who *enable* an advisor team to operate in geographic isolation (e.g., independent duty corpsmen (IDC), JTAC, FO, and force protection (FP) personnel or detachments.
- **Handshake-CON:** An informal command relationship used frequently within RC (SW).
- **Kandak:** An Afghan battalion.
- **Lift-off:** Until recently, a frequently used term; *lift-off* is the act of permanently withdrawing a SFA-AT and leaving an ANSF unit unadvised or uncovered.⁷² Per Commander ISAF (COMISAF) direction, the term *uplift* has replaced lift-off.⁷³
- **Mentoring:** In general usage, a synonym for advising defined specifically as a relationship in which the mentor teaches, guides, and advises in order to build individual and unit competency.⁷⁴
- **Partnering:** An arrangement in which CF and ANSF units share comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, and tactical directives.⁷⁵ Conversely, un-partnering is the act of discontinuing the partnership relationship between a CF and ANSF unit for bilateral operations and QRF support.
- **Rating Definition Levels (RDL):** Central to assessments, scaled “RDL ratings reflect an ANSF unit's overall operational effectiveness.”⁷⁶
- **Security Force Assistance (SFA):** Activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.⁷⁷ Although similar, SFA is a subset of *security cooperation* (SC), which is defined as interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly

military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.⁷⁸

- **Tashkiel:** A document stipulating force structure, personnel end strength, command relationships, unit/staff functions, mission descriptions, and equipment, which functions as a table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for ANA and ANP units.⁷⁹
- **Tolai:** An Afghan company.

Organizations

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

- **Afghan National Army (ANA):** The ANA is a MOD organization and the largest component of the ANSF, currently numbering approximately 187,000 personnel. It is comprised of a capital division and 6 regional corps; the 215th Corps and its five brigades are based within RC (SW)'s AO.
- **Afghan National Police (ANP):** The ANP falls under the MOI and is organized into 6 regional commands; its subordinate 'pillars' include the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), Afghan Local Police (ALP), and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) described below.
- **Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP):** The AUP is the largest policing organization within Afghanistan and maintains rule of law through an intelligence based policing mode. AUP functions include "policing and providing public services, training and education, as well as equipping...in order to prevent and detect crime, assure public safety, maintain civil order, protect property and safely control traffic."⁸⁰ Unlike the strongly nationalist ANA, the AUP is a locally recruited and "district-centered" institution.⁸¹
- **Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP):** The ANCOP is a gendarmerie organized geographically into 6 regional brigades and 25 line and 6 Special Support Kandaks (SSK) and is the lead police organization in COIN operations.⁸² Currently, the ANCOP is organized and employed as infantry vice police.⁸³ ANCOP units are nationally deployable by MOI mandate in accordance with scaled readiness windows of green, amber, and red.⁸⁴ [MCCLL note: *gendarmerie* is a French term describing a soldier employed as a policeman.]
- **Afghan Border Police (ABP):** The ABP secures and safeguards national borders and maintains security in the Border Security Zone [REDACTED]⁸⁵ [REDACTED]
- **Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP):** The AACP provides investigative and intelligence police capabilities at all levels from the MOI to regional zones, provinces, and districts; the AACP

provides special technical functions including counter-terrorism, counter narcotics, criminal investigation, major crimes force, police special operations units, and forensics.⁸⁷

- **Afghan Local Police (ALP):** The ALP contributes to sustained security, expanded governance, and increased development; it is a temporary organization without a police mandate to investigate crime or make arrests.⁸⁸ The ALP may transition at some point to some other ANSF pillar.

- **Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF):** The APPF protects key infrastructure, facilities, construction projects, and personnel thereby relieving the AUP of some of those responsibilities.
- **Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA):** The CNPA is the lead agency for "reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan."⁹⁰
- **National Directorate of Security (NDS):** The NDS or *Amaniyat* is the GIRoA domestic intelligence agency roughly analogous to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- **Operational Coordination Center (OCC):** ANSF OCCs at the district, provincial, and regional levels function as joint operations centers intended to maintain common operational pictures (COP) and facilitate planning and coordination; they are comprised of representatives from ANA, AUP, ABP, CNPA, NDS, ISAF, and other organizations. The "relationship between the OCCs and... CFs is symbiotic; the OCC relies on...CF...administrative support, security, and local situational awareness; the CF gets, in return, a single point of contact for liaison purposes."⁹¹

Higher/Adjacent

- **ISAF:** ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the ANSF, and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.
- **ISAF Joint Command (IJC):** In partnership with the ANSF and relevant organizations, the IJC conducts population-centric comprehensive operations to neutralize the insurgency in specified areas, and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable peace.
- **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A):** Formerly called the Coalition Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), NTM-A has primary responsibility for building ANSF long-term capability at the national level. The organization is responsible for advising above corps-level for the ANA and above the provincial-level for the ANP; as well, NTM-A is responsible for national/regional-level training facilities and logistics.
- **Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT):** The Helmand PRT in Lash'kar Gah is a UK-led multinational civil-military organization that works closely with RC (SW) to help the GIRoA deliver governance and economic development.

Regional Command (Southwest)

- **C10 Staff Section:** Created in 2009, the C10 was, until recently, the RC (SW) staff section with primary responsibility for ANSF development. In recognition of ANSF development as a whole of staff undertaking, coincident with the RIP/TOA of I MEF (Fwd) by II MEF (Fwd), the C10 section was stood down and its functions distributed across the entire staff. The section's two logistical planners were moved to the C4; the remaining planners were split between C3 Current and Future Operations and C5 Plans.⁹²
- **Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW):** Organized around the MEF Headquarters Group (Fwd), the Marine-led, multinational TFBW, in cooperation with CF and the GIRoA, controls AO Belleau Wood through security and limited COIN operations in order to facilitate RC (SW)'s efforts to support stability and development.
- **Task Force Leatherneck (TFL):** Organized around the Marine Division (Fwd), TFL is the Marine-led multinational force within RC (SW) based at Camp Leatherneck.
- **Task Force Helmand (TFH):** Established in 2006, TFH is the UK-led multinational force within RC (SW) based at Camp Bastion.
- **Brigade Advisor Group (BAG):** Within TFH, ANA advising is conducted by the BAG—an UK infantry battalion specially trained for the mission; conversely, USMC SFA-ATs are globally-sourced, unlike the unit-sourced Embedded Training Teams (ETT) that preceded them.
- **Police Mentoring and Advisor Group (PMAG):** The PMAG is the TFH organization responsible for mentoring provincial and district chiefs of police and advising district level ANP units.

Training

- **Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL):** Based in Quantico, CAOCL executes operationally focused training and education in individual training, professional military education (PME), and pre-deployment phases, reflecting current and likely contingencies and functions, to ensure Marines and leaders deploy with a grasp of culture and indigenous dynamics.
- **Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG):** In October 2011, the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) merged with the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC) to become MCSCG, which executes and enables SC programs, training, planning, and activities in support of Marine Corps operations.
- **Advisor Training Group (ATG):** Located at Twenty-nine Palms, California, the ATG trains Marine Corps advisor teams to advise, mentor, and train foreign military, police, and border units in operational techniques and procedures to combat terrorism and counterinsurgency. It provides SFA-AT Block IV assessment and the MRX as well as limited Block III training.⁹³
- **Advisor Training Center (ATC):** The ATCs are MEF organizations that conduct SFA-AT Block II-III training at home station.
- **Joint Sustainment Academy Southwest (JSAS):** Disestablished in early 2012, the academy provided leadership and collective combat and policing skills training to ANSF personnel and units operating within the RC (SW) AO.

- **Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC):** The KMTC is the ANA's premier training facility with a student/recruit capacity of over 11,000.⁹⁴
- **Regional Military Training Center (RMTC):** The RMTC is an ANA Training Command resource [REDACTED] that "took over the syllabus of the JSAS" and functions effectively as a "Division Schools."⁹⁵ The syllabus will be expanded in the future to include mortar and artillery training.
- **Regional Training Center (RTC):** [REDACTED], the RTC provides basic and specialized ANP training.

Logistics

- **Regional Logistics Center (RLC):** The RLC is an independent ANP command that provides training and oversight for all classes of supply, as well as training in ammunition, fuel, and warehouse management.⁹⁶
- **Regional Logistics Support Center (RLSC):** [REDACTED] the RLSC is the ANA counterpart to the RLC described above and provides general logistics support to the ANA within Helmand and Nimruz provinces. It is the regional supply chain manager providing the full spectrum of logistical general support, supply, distribution, and maintenance.⁹⁷ Its higher headquarters is the Army Support Command in Kabul.

Command Relationships (COMREL)

(U// [REDACTED] Within RC (SW), SFA-ATs are provided by both the USMC and UK; ANSF and RC (SW) boundaries and force laydown and differing USMC and UK approaches to advising including COMREL create certain C2, administrative, and logistical challenges.

- Until recently, higher headquarters (HHQ) SFA-ATs—the so-called 'Big Six'—(i.e., 215th Corps ANA, 707 Zone AUP, OCC-R, PPAT, 5th Brigade ANCOP, and 6th Zone ABP) reported directly to the C10 but belonged administrative and logistically to TFBW.⁹⁸ The four Marine HHQ SFA-ATs located in TFH's AO (i.e., 707 Zone AUP, PPAT, 5th Brigade ANCOP, and 6th Zone ABP) are 'handshake-CON' to TFH at Lash'kar Gah; these teams receive Class I support from TFH and the remainder of supply, equipment, and maintenance support from TFBW.
- Within TFL, advisor teams are subordinate to and report through their parent BSO (generally the RCT); within TFH, teams are subordinate to the UK PMAG and BAG described above.

(U// [REDACTED] Representative examples of SFA-AT COMREL/C2 challenges include:

- The 215th Corps (ANA) occupies both TFL and TFH battle space; however, the Corps' SFA-AT reports to TFL (only); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Similarly, in many instances, ANSF and SFA-AT chains of command and command relationships are not parallel.¹⁰⁰
- A degree of redundancy exists between the USMC PPAT and UK PMAG; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- Unit recently, HHQ ANP SFA-ATs exercised only direct liaison authority (DIRLAUTH) with subordinate DPATs and kandak-level ANCOP and ABP advisor teams.

(U//) Within TFL, COMREL for ANA SFA-ATs are changing; increasingly, the C10 exercised tactical control (TACON) relationships with SFA-ATs for ANSF development issues. This relationship more closely parallels COMREL used in TFH. As the C10 Deputy Director, observed, "It's... a natural progression as the battle space owners become fewer and fewer."¹⁰² Coincident with the stand-down of the C10, the HHQ SFA-ATs now fall under the direct cognizance of the RC (SW) Deputy Commander (DCOM) for SFA.¹⁰³

(U//) COMREL/C2 challenges notwithstanding, ANSF development efforts are closely coordinated through a variety of formal working groups, boards, and meetings, including the ANSF Transformation Program Board and ANSF Weekly Synchronization Meeting.¹⁰⁶

Operational Coordination Centers

(U//) The OCC is a priority, but nascent capability at all levels. The OCC-R (Regional) functions as a joint ANSF information center; it is the highest level OCC, receiving information from the OCC-Ps (Provincial) and OCC-Ds (District).

the OCC-R does contribute significantly to coordination. Its primary function is the dissemination of information regarding INS activity.¹⁰⁷ Efforts have focused on establishing a '5W' approach (i.e., who, what, when, where, and why) to facilitate COP maintenance.¹⁰⁸ As Senior Advisor to the 5th Brigade ANCOP observed: "There's no [Afghan] civilian equivalent level of governance to the regional command, so...I think [the OCC-R] is something that's probably more helpful for us than it is for the Afghans."¹⁰⁹

(U//) The ten district-level OCC-Ds—most located in District Police Headquarters (DPHQ)—are a non-doctrinal RC (SW) initiative logistically supported by the RLC and not yet reflected in MOI tashkiels.^{110 111}

While ANA units are able to track kandaks, OCC-D success will hinge on establishment of a sound working relationship between the ANA and ANP;

[MCCLL note: Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0) defines a common operational picture (COP) as a single identical display of relevant information shared by multiple commands to facilitate collaborative planning and promote situational awareness. A common tactical picture (CTP), on the other hand, is a complete display of tactical data integrating information from multi-tactical data link, ground, intelligence, and senior networks.]

(U//) The DPAT advises the OCC-D as a collateral duty; conversely, the OCC-P and OCC-R have dedicated advisor teams. The effectiveness of any OCC is contingent on leadership and limited to some degree by the literacy of ANSF personnel.¹¹⁴ [MCCLL note: the many challenges posed by Afghan literacy rates are addressed more fully in the discussion of the ANSF below.]

(U//)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U//) Although the OCCs exist to facilitate situational awareness, interviewees agreed that unless the ANSF accepts their potential utility and invests in their success, "The OCC structure will fold." ^{117 118}

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It is unclear at this time whether the MOI will institutionalize the OCC-Ds and general concern that the construct will ultimately be abandoned. ^{120 121}

Advisor Teams

Manning

(U//) Advisor team manning requirements are constantly evolving in light of changes on the battlefield and emerging ANSF requirements. Consequently, given the long lead time associated with manning and training, SFA-AT manning documents must be reviewed and amended routinely. ¹²²

(U//) The key difference between UK and USMC sourcing "is that a Brigade Advisor Group...is an UK Army infantry battalion trained to deliver that mission"; USMC advisor teams, on the other hand, are globally sourced. Consequently, the BSO and USMC SFA-AT likely do not have established relationships. ^{123 124}



(U) Figure 2: The Senior Advisor, RLSC-SW SFA-AT, communicates through an interpreter with his Afghan counterpart [REDACTED] 15 March 2012.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] alternative perspective was offered by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who favors the global sourcing

approach. He suggested that if advisors were sourced from the BSO, the most capable personnel might not be detailed to advisor duties; moreover, he feared that the specialized advisor PTP might be impacted negatively. ¹²⁶

(U//) Unlike the Marine Corps, which is focused at the kandak-level and above, the UK model employed advisors down to the tolai-level until December 2012.^{127 128}

(U//) As noted earlier, effective advisors share in common certain qualities and characteristics: experience is an important factor as is maturity and focused training. All agreed that highly qualified and motivated advisors are instrumental to the SFA mission's success. A common theme voiced by advisors is the advantage of incentivizing advising to attract the best and brightest; () the Senior Advisor to the 2d Brigade, 215th Corps, recommended consideration of combat meritorious promotion of enlisted advisors and command slating of senior advisor billets for lieutenant colonels and colonels.¹²⁹ () supported the latter suggestion: "If we're going to get advising right, the guys at the helm need to be almost handpicked, close to the way we do command screening."¹³⁰ Given the uniqueness of advisor duty, it has been recommended that administrative procedures to document advisor service be established; moreover, some have recommended establishing an MOS for advisors.¹³¹

(U//) Although specific advisor team structure varies by type and size of ANSF unit advised, teams typically include the following billets or functions: team leader/senior advisor, assistant team leader, senior enlisted advisor, administration, intelligence, operations, training, logistics, medical, and communications.¹³² Moreover, trained field ordering officers/pay agents (FOO/PA) and contracting officer representatives (COR) are instrumental. RC (SW) recommends that teams deploy with "at least four designated FOO/PAs; two to handle Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) funds for CF requirements and two for Afghanistan Security Forces Funding (ASFF) for ANSF requirements."¹³³ Additionally, two CORs are recommended for each team. [MCCLL note: ASFF funds construction "of enduring and temporary infrastructure, as well as sustainment of associated services such as life support and training."¹³⁴]

(U//) As a general rule increasingly important as CFs drawdown, advisor teams require organic fire coordination and control capabilities such as JTACs, FACs, and FOs. SFA-AT T/Os at the district (ANP) and kandak (ANA) levels include JTACs and although ANP units do not execute fires, the SFA-AT operations officer billet for ANP SFA-ATs is typically a combat arms officer.¹³⁵ () the Senior Advisor to the 6th Zone ABP, expressed the requirement emphatically: "Advisor teams need to have JTACs at the kandak level and below."¹³⁶

(U//) Illustrating the close SFA-AT/BSO relationship, () noted that advisor capability and skill deficiencies were sometimes mitigated by drawing personnel from the host BSO.¹³⁷

(U//) In addition to the various types of formal SFA-ATs, Kandak Liaison (LNO) Cells of 2-5 personnel—formed either from an SFA-AT or BSO—fill the gap between departure of a full SFA-AT and final lift-off or uplift. The LNO Cells support ANSF and governmental development, equipment retrograde, and act as a liaison between ANSF units and the BSO; the frequency of LNO Cell advising ranges from daily to 3-4 times weekly. () the 2d Kandak, 1st Brigade, 215th Corps LNO Chief, described the challenge confronted by small LNO cells: "The trickiest thing is [being the go-between the BSO and ANSF during] the entire transition to ANSF-lead."¹³⁸ Kandak LNO Cells are usually co-located at Marine company-level patrol bases (PB).^{139 140}

Training

(U//) The typical SFA-AT PTP continuum is approximately 140 days. Basic individual and team Block I-III (~70 days) training is conducted by the parent unit and MEF-level ATCs; Block IV (~29 days) assessment is the purview of the ATG and culminates with an intensive MRX; PTP concludes with a two week long remediation period, leave, and embarkation and deployment preparation (~30 days) followed by in-country training including advanced marksmanship training.

(U//) ATG's systems approach to Block IV assessment and training emphasizes: rapport building; combined operations planning; mounted and dismounted tactical operations; COIN operations; police operations, site exploitation and detainee handling; integration of PRTs and a whole of government approach; and ANSF assessment techniques. Training includes live-fire foreign weapons training and the motorized patrol course; CIED training (Attack the Network and Defeat the Network) is integrated into all events. All training is supported by CAOCL and a large cadre of HN role players.

(U//) Block IV training begins with an initial assessment of war fighting and advisor skills with emphasis on communications, weapons, medical, language, and cultural awareness. All training is observed and evaluated; the final assessment is reported to the parent MEF via the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Center (MAGTFTC).

(U//) Pre-deployment training in general and ATG Block IV training, specifically, is viewed positively by advisors. The general consensus of brigade-level and below SFA-ATs was that the top three ATG PTP vignettes were: cultural immersion, convoy operations, and CIED.¹⁴¹

(U//) Some interviewees noted that given the presence of embedded interpreters, less language training is necessary; moreover, they stressed the importance of cultural awareness and suggested more such training; others emphasized the importance of sufficient language skills to allow advisors to judge counterpart tone and intent.¹⁴² For brigade level SFA-ATs, recommended additional instruction in COC and staff development.¹⁴³ Advisors assigned to the OCC-R did attend the MAGTF Integrated Systems Training Center (MISTC) Watch Officer Course during PTP. Moreover, ATG directed training incorporates battalion level unit management COC scenarios.¹⁴⁴

(U//) A number of interviewees stressed the importance of sensitive site exploitation (SSE) training for police advisor teams; others emphasized the necessity of a thorough understanding of MOI processes, as well as an appreciation of the Afghan constitution and law.^{145 146} To that end, a LEP with RC (SW), suggested utilization of the Host National Police Advising program—a 40 hour course for PATs that addresses these subjects.¹⁴⁷

(U//) Some advisors suggested that PTP for HHQ SFA-ATs should focus less on “hard skills and more on [the] soft skills” necessary for staff advising and recommended consideration of the U.S. Army's Advisors Course at Ft. Irwin as an adjunct to PTP. Similarly, HHQ advisors noted that the current RSO&I training program emphasizes dismounted operations although the HHQ SFA-ATs rarely conduct such operations.¹⁴⁸ Several advisors pointed to vehicle roll-over training as a prominent example of redundant PTP training; some teams reported completing such training three times. In light of the tremendous effort devoted to administration and logistics, the Garmshir DPAT Senior Advisor, recommended that the MOD-14 requisition process receive significant attention in PTP.¹⁴⁹

(U// [REDACTED]) In light of significant requirements for generator and vehicle maintenance and other basic camp support functions, cross-training SFA-AT members in such skills is advantageous and would limit BSO augmentation and attendant force protection and life support requirements.

(U// [REDACTED]) emphasized the importance of securing access to the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) early during PTP in order to permit access to all material required to build knowledge and situational awareness. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED]) As part of the Weekly Synchronization Meeting, a secure video teleconference (SVTC) is conducted with the ATCs and ATG to allow continuous PTP improvements; SFA-ATs in the PTP pipeline observe these SVTCs to broaden their situational awareness.¹⁵¹ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Equipment

(U// [REDACTED]) An advisor team's equipment density list (EDL) or mission essential equipment list (MEEL) includes unit sourced or organic equipment, BSO equipment provided via consolidated memorandum of receipt (CMR) or equipment custody receipt (ECR), and theater-provided equipment (TPE). [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] RC (SW)'s C4 Planner, noted that a comprehensive equipment list for all SFA-ATs was currently being consolidated.¹⁵³
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED]) All SFA ATs below the brigade/zone level (i.e., non-HHQ teams) receive Class I-IX logistics support from the BSO. As well, the BSO provides the majority of equipment maintenance support.¹⁵⁵

Operations

(U// [REDACTED]) An SFA-AT's operational efforts focus on the three core responsibilities: (1) training, (2), advise and assist, and (3) assessment.¹⁵⁶ Although specific requirements and challenges differ from team to team—for example, the emphasis of an advisor team advising an OCC or logistics center will likely differ significantly from that of a team assigned to a kandak or brigade—certain considerations and challenges are universal. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED]) Similarly, interviewees agreed that general focus on the 'basics' is essential although it was emphasized that that the basics alone are insufficient to achieve genuine competency.¹⁵⁸ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] teams should stress "patrolling, CIED and detainee operations,

intelligence, and logistics.”¹⁵⁹ Moreover, given the importance placed on the OCCs, efforts to encourage coordination and exchange of mutual support where appropriate between the ANA and various ANP pillars are vital. Interviewees also stressed the importance of expectation management—for both advisors and Afghans; as noted by [REDACTED] “expectations need to be managed and it comes back to [achieving]...sufficiency and the ability to manage the levels of violence....”¹⁶⁰

(U// [REDACTED] An advisor's influence is constrained to some degree by his capacity to provide essential support; the so-called ‘leverage’ resident in the capacity to withhold support is an important coercive tool. Advisors should make provision of enablers (e.g., QRF, fires, air support, and logistics) at least partly contingent on cooperation.

(U// [REDACTED] A seamless RIP/TOA is necessary for continuity and to reassure ANSF counterparts; extensive left seat/right seat activities and a concrete training plan are instrumental to this end.¹⁶¹ Very few USMC advisors have the opportunity to conduct PDSSs; those that did, including [REDACTED] the Senior Advisor to the 1st Brigade, 215th Corps, emphasized their important contribution to situational awareness.¹⁶² [REDACTED]



(U) Figure 3: A Marine with Police Advisor Team 4 talks to a shopkeeper in Kajaki district 10 July 2012.

(U// [REDACTED] The BSO tracks and monitors SFA-AT movement [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹⁶⁵ Fires in support of SFA-AT operations are coordinated with the BSO in the same manner used for any independent unit.^{166 167} [REDACTED] the Senior Advisor to the 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 215th Corps, noted that cross boundary coordination with non-U.S. CF units can be challenging.¹⁶⁸ [REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED] emphasized that uplift or unpartnering is generally irrevocable: “It's got to be understood by everybody that once the decision is made to unpartner from a unit or from a district...there's no going back.”¹⁷¹

(U// [REDACTED] Commenting on the timing of uplift, [REDACTED] observed, “It should be tied to the time phasing of units, so if the BSO is going to pull out, pull the SFA-AT out.”¹⁷² Similarly, [REDACTED] emphasized the importance of incrementally reducing partner unit and advisor personnel presence to acclimate ANSF units to the transition and mitigate the associated stress; he noted that to “have an entire squad on a patrol base one day and then have them...leave the...[next]...causes an incredible amount of anxiety.”^{173 174}

Intelligence

(U//) Advisor team intelligence support is provided by their higher headquarters/BSO and respective TFs. The RC (SW) Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC) figures prominently in this regard;

(U//) In light of the dramatic draw down in forces, BSOs rely increasingly on SFA-AT reporting to maintain the intelligence picture and general situational awareness.¹⁷⁸

Security (Force Protection)

(U//) Force protection is of primary concern and influences all activities; further discussion of FP considerations is contained in the "Insider Threat" section below.

(U//) For SFA-ATs operating in isolated areas with high threat levels, reinforcement with force protection personnel—typically from the BSO—is vital. A case in point: an SFA-AT, co-located with its ANA counterparts in a remote location, was augmented with an infantry squad (minus).¹⁸² Similarly, at one combat outpost (COP), the SFA-AT had both an internal Base Defense Plan, as well as a joint plan with its Afghan partners; FP augmentees from the BSO assisted with tower watch and Guardian Angel duties.¹⁸³



(U) Figure 4: A Marine with an ANCOP SFA-AT provides security while his teammates conduct medical training 18 December 2012.

(U//) For Marine SFA-ATs based within TFH quick reaction force (QRF) support is provided by the TFH QRF at Lash'kar Gah.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED]) Typically, SFA-AT T/Os include a corpsman or Independent Duty Corpsman (IDC); for district, kandak, and brigade teams, MEDEVAC support is coordinated through the BSO; in the case of HHQ teams, MEDEVAC is coordinated through either TFL or TFH based on location.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Sustainment

(U// [REDACTED]) A supported/supporting relationship exists between SFA-ATs and the respective BSOs.¹⁸⁷ The logistics models used in the northern and southern AOs of TFL are different; the southern AO relies on LOGCAP (Logistics Capability) or HN support while in the north, logistics support is provided largely by CF air delivery. As the drawdown continues and the CF footprint diminishes, requirements for organic support in the southern AO particularly may increase. [REDACTED] RCT-7's S4 officer, noted that retrograde is both time and resource intensive and that force protection measures remain a priority throughout.¹⁸⁸

Personnel and Administration

(U// [REDACTED]) [REDACTED] the 1st ANCOP Brigade Advisor Team (BAT) emphasized the importance of an advanced party (ADVON/Advanced Echelon) and recommended that it arrive 10 days prior to the main body and include maintenance and communications advisors and the FOO and pay agent.¹⁸⁹

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

ANSF Units

(U// [REDACTED]) "We teach warfighting and...mission tactics. These guys teach to play it safe; one guy and one guy alone can make the decision and holds...responsibility for that decision."

[REDACTED] Senior Advisor, 2d Kandak, 2d Brigade, 215th Corps

(U// [REDACTED]) Interviewees agreed that fundamental infantry skills (e.g. marksmanship, weapons maintenance, patrolling skills, post standing, and basic discipline) are critical. Beyond these basic capabilities, an effective ANSF unit must have effective leadership and the capacity to plan, execute, and sustain independent operations. Conversely, indicators of weak units include poor weapon handling

skills, limited patrolling and post standing, unit defeat in combat engagement, and inability to coordinate offensive operations. Personnel and equipment accountability, administration (i.e., pay and leave), and general maintenance also are fundamental indicators of proficiency. Afghan unit capability is generally reflective of leadership, unit cohesion, and threat level. [REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED]) A more detailed discussion of the character of ANSF units and personnel is contained in the "Culture" section below.

Manning

(U// [REDACTED]) The ANA and ANP are fundamentally different in character: the ANA is a national organization recruited from across Afghanistan and reflective of the country's ethnic and tribal diversity; ANP units on the other hand are more provincial and ethnically homogenous.

Training

(U// [REDACTED]) Basic training for the ANA is conducted at the KMTC [REDACTED] most training for ANP personnel is conducted at the [REDACTED] Regional Training Center (RTC); the entry level course—"The

Basic Eight'—is an eight week period of instruction covering human rights, constitutional law, firearms, and survival training. Other courses include the Sergeant Academy (NCO school), CIED Awareness, Field Medic, and Basic Officer. Specialized training including Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Technician, Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) Operator, and Basic Tactical Officer courses

200

(U//) basic skill training is continuous for all units; consequently, train the trainer (T3) packages are instrumental to developing and maintaining basic skills and an organic training capacity. 201



(U) Figure 5: ANA soldiers from 4th Kandak, 215th Corps train on a Russian D-30 2A18M 122mm towed howitzer at Camp Shorabak 2 December 2012.

(U//) Literacy rates impact every facet of training and operations. For example, the inability to read maps impacts the accuracy of position reporting and, consequently, the capacity to secure support in kinetic situations. 202 Literacy is thus deemed a "critical force enabler" and multiplier and literacy training efforts are extensive. As of September 2012, over 3,000 literacy teachers were actively employed across Afghanistan. While functional literacy rates are modestly improving, significant challenges remain, particularly in the ANA. 203

(U//) Advisors noted that the best opportunity for training ANCOP units was the 'amber' readiness window due to the unit's general emphasis on training during that period and the return of personnel from block leave. 205

Operations

(U//) The distinguishing characteristic of the last year has been an increase in ANSF-led operations and corresponding decrease in CF-led operations. Currently, throughout Afghanistan, fewer than 15% of operations are led by ISAF; within RC (SW), all operations are ANSF-led. 206 Interviewees agreed that the ultimate indication of advisor success is a unit's capacity to plan and execute independent operations.

Advisors noted that a flexible model for C2 is necessary; in instances where centralized C2 is effective, the SFA-AT may actually reinforce the approach.²¹⁰

(U//[REDACTED]) Because the ANSF is not a homogenous institution, training and assessment criteria must further be refined for the ANA and ANP; while the primary objective of ANA is combat power and war fighting; the ANP, on the other hand, is designed ultimately for community policing. Until security levels improve, however, the ANP will continue to focus more heavily on COIN than on community policing.²¹¹
²¹²

(U//[REDACTED]) For the ANA, key development areas requiring continued emphasis include C2, CIED, fires, engineering, aviation, and logistics.

(U//[REDACTED]) Although effective ANP units must demonstrate the same fundamental skill set expected of their ANA peers, assessing the performance of ANP units is different; relevant criterion include: police chief visits to subordinate posts; active patrolling; public confidence as evidenced by people coming to police headquarters or posts to report intelligence or seek assistance; limited police predation and abuse of the populace; and unauthorized detainee releases. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Intelligence

(U//[REDACTED]) Indicators of effective intelligence activities include coalition raids based on ANSF gathered intelligence, productive informant networks, and the absence of INS infiltration.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Logistics

(U//[REDACTED]) The direct impact of advisors is often reflected most dramatically in an ANSF unit's logistics capabilities: supply (including individual gear, rations, fuel, and ammunition) and equipment, vehicle, and weapon maintenance. ANSF logistics processes and routing chains differ for ANA and ANP units.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//[REDACTED]) The ANSF logistics process is characterized as 'push' vice 'pull', that is, materiel is distributed from the national level at Kabul to Helmand on a routine, usually monthly, basis; this methodology complicates the standard MOD/MOI-14 request process [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Senior Advisor to the 2d

Brigade, 215th Corps, recommended that during PTP, advisors familiarize themselves with Soviet style logistics in order to better appreciate the institutional basis of ANSF processes, as well as to inform efforts to establish structural/functional improvements and accountability.²²⁴

(U//) The ANA and ANP maintain regional logistics warehouses, the Regional Logistics Support Center (RLSC) and Regional Logistics Center (RLC), respectively. The NTM-A maintains advisor teams at each and RC (SW) SFA-ATs are required to coordinate regularly with these regional-level teams.²²⁵

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//) Each ANA brigade has a Combat Support (CS) Kandak, which provides reconnaissance, engineer, artillery, and aviation general support; the brigade advisor teams provide a small detachment to the CS Kandak that includes typically an O-3 (captain) MOS 1302 and an E-7 (gunnery sergeant) MOS 1371.²²⁷ Additionally, the BATs advise the CS Kandaks' reconnaissance tolais.²²⁸ The similarly named Combat Service Support (CSS) Kandak within each brigade provides direct support logistics. The ANA employs a 'hub and spoke' logistics model; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//) The ability to forecast logistical requirements is nascent, however, last year, the RLSC did, for the first time, forecast diesel, gasoline, and propane requirements based on consideration of current and emerging units and capabilities.²³² Continued ANSF logistical progress will hinge on an efficient logistical system, effective formal schools, and reasonable standards of accountability.

(U//) The MOI/MOD-14 request process is complicated and cumbersome. At one time, up to 15 signatures were required to order an item; refinements to the process have cut the approval chain in half; nonetheless, the process remains inefficient. [REDACTED] of CLR-15's ANSF Development Cell, observed that if an individual in the approval chain is unavailable, "the process stops cold...; there is [no one else who]...can sign on his behalf."²³³ Similarly, accurately tracking receipt and transfers of ownership via the MOI/MOD-9 receipt form is problematic.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//) ANSF tashkiels are constantly being revised complicating supply and maintenance efforts; moreover, the impact of ANSF equipment shortfalls highlights the importance of maintenance training and management.²³⁶ ANSF preventative and corrective maintenance capabilities are limited and

exacerbated by shortages of Class IX repair parts.²³⁷ For ANA units, basic maintenance is provided by the CSS Kandaks described above; for 2d and 3d echelon repairs beyond CSS Kandak capability, vehicles and equipment are inducted into the RLSC maintenance [REDACTED]²³⁸ ANP vehicle maintenance is provided largely through the Automotive Maintenance Service (AMS) contract facility [REDACTED]²³⁹ ANA weapons maintenance efforts are generally more efficient than ANP; for instance, whereas the ANA utilizes modern NATO weapons, the ANP relies on legacy Russian/Czechoslovakian AK-47s for which parts are scarce.²⁴⁰

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Medical

(U// [REDACTED] ANSF medical capabilities are limited by a critical shortage of trained professionals, but improving slowly; efforts have focused on development of key organic capabilities including notably CASEVAC; commenting on ANA progress in this regard, [REDACTED] observed "they're stepping up to the plate and have been evacuating their own casualties.... Now we're beginning to look at their ability to provide air MEDEVAC/CASEVAC from the battle space."²⁴² [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Personnel and Administration

(U// [REDACTED] The MOI established a ministerial-level human resources (HR) Tactical Integrated Ground Reporting (TIGR) team, which circulates throughout the country to meet with ANP commanders "to reaffirm personnel policy, direction, and process."²⁴⁴ The team is comprised of 5-6 Afghan colonels accompanied by CF advisors; specific areas addressed include personnel, recruiting, biometrics, and identification cards.²⁴⁵


Culture

(U// [REDACTED] Interviewees emphasized the absolute primacy of cultural awareness. Commenting on the impact of generally sharp cultural differences and profoundly different perspectives on corruption, [REDACTED] observed, "We still want to impose idealistic western ideals...and we *shouldn't* because they're just not relevant to the Afghans."²⁴⁶

(U// [REDACTED] Culture also plays a huge role in inter-Afghan relationships; within the ANA, Religious and Cultural Affairs (RCA) officers educate ANA soldiers on cultural differences to ameliorate ethnic and tribal tensions, improve unit cohesion and cooperation, and to mitigate the insider threat.²⁴⁷

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



(U) Figure 6: A Marine advisor makes chai tea with an AUP counterpart 20 November 2012.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED] In light on the value placed on *seniority* by Afghans, [REDACTED] the 4th Brigade, 215th Corps, Deputy Senior Advisor, recommended in instances in which advisors are junior to ANSF counterparts, that the senior advisor follow-up junior officer/personnel engagement to reinforce and validate the exchange. ²⁵²

(U// [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U// [REDACTED] Interviewees stressed the important role played by traditional 'community justice' processes by which crimes are adjudicated by village elders vice the formal justice system; [REDACTED] a LEP with RC (SW), summed it up this way, "the idea is to make the community whole, so if they do that through a fine or [by]...making reparations to the victim, then everybody is happy. We...shouldn't be second guessing that [approach]." ²⁵⁵

(U// [REDACTED] Expectation management concerning objectives—for both SFA-ATs and ANSF units—informed by an appreciation for cultural and environmental factors is important; sustainable "small-scale" improvements are generally more practical than dramatic, sweeping changes. ²⁵⁶

Assessments

(U// [REDACTED] The success of advisor team efforts hinges in part on the ability to gauge accurately ANSF unit capabilities. While assessment is a continuous process, the primary means of formal assessment is the CUAT. As described earlier, the report contains both objective and subjective elements. Reports are submitted quarterly to the RC and address "nine capabilities-based functional areas: leadership, operations, intelligence, logistics, equipping, personnel, maintenance, communications, and training and education." ^{257 258} [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//) The RDLs described earlier are integral to the CUAT; the "nine functional areas receive...[their] own RDL which is based on a combination of a qualitative expert military assessment supported by quantitative data across three areas: manning, equipping, and training." ²⁶¹ Logistics mission essential task lists (METL) are assessed within the context of the CUAT via the Logistics Capability Assessment Report (LCAR).

(U//) As a rule, ANSF units cannot be adequately evaluated until the unit has operated independently. The decision to uplift or uncover a unit is made by the SFA-AT in concert with the BSO, RC (SW), and IJC. Following uplift, 'Level-2' monitoring continues wherein advisor teams or partner units visit periodically to assess status. ²⁶² [MCCLL note: Level-1 advising is characterized by active, continuous contact; Level-2 advising, on the other hand, is achieved through routine visits. Within RC (SW), the two levels are described as *grip* and *touch*, respectively.]

Insider Threat

(U//) Insider attacks increased sharply in 2012 resulting in a tremendous effort on the part of both the GIRoA and ISAF to understand the phenomenon and determine effective mitigation measures. ISAF categorizes insider attacks as: infiltration, co-option, impersonation, and personal motives including ideological reasons, stress, and grievances. ²⁶³ Since peaking in the summer of 2012, insider attack levels have declined. Important aspects of the insider threat are the so-called 'green-on-green' attacks, that is, Afghan on Afghan. As noted, "One of the keys with the insider threat is to remember that the Afghan leadership is as much a target as coalition members, so a team should not drive a wedge between itself and the leadership; it should really embrace the leadership as part of the solution." ²⁶⁴

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//) the 707 Zone's Senior Advisor, expressed succinctly the challenge confronting all SFA-ATs: "Force protection is the first and primary concern." ²⁶⁶ Advisors must be acutely sensitive to anything abnormal (i.e., out of the ordinary) and immediately bring concerns to the attention of senior ANSF leaders. ²⁶⁷ While some interviewees supported a "distancing" approach, others stressed the importance of establishing and maintaining close relations. ²⁶⁸ RCT-7's ANSF Cell Officer-in-Charge (OIC), observed, "Dealing with the insider threat is counterintuitive.... You need to get closer...talk to them more...and you need to be in proximity to them." ²⁶⁹ In this vein, stressed the importance of strong personal relationships: "If an Afghan commander...values his partnership with coalition forces, he's going to go out of his way to protect [them]." ²⁷⁰

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//) Central to IT mitigation efforts is the Guardian Angel program, which is, in essence, the employment of armed personnel to provide an added layer of continuous FP to CF personnel in contact with the ANSF.²⁷² Speaking to the operational impact of such necessary measures, () noted that IT and Guardian Angel requirements are manpower intensive and serve to effectively limit advising capacity.²⁷³

(U//) The ATG package includes IT training; as well, per IJC requirement, two personnel from every team attend a two day IT-Situational Awareness Training (IT-SAT) course in Kabul; additionally, IT training is conducted at Camp Leatherneck. In light of the pervasiveness of the insider threat, () emphasized the necessity of thorough, continuous force protection training: "You need to increase force protection training...[and] you need to increase insider threat training."²⁷⁴

(U//) Detailed IT mitigation measures are described in a variety of SOPs and directives including RC (SW) SOP 3221 and the COMISAF Insider Threat Tactical Directive. ()

() the MEF's LEP, noted the advantage of periodic assessments of IT/FP measures by individuals from outside the SFA-AT and recommended that inbound advisors be updated on recent insider attacks and associated lessons learned during RSO&I.²⁷⁶

(U//) Addressing the challenges inherent to the insider threat, () observed: "We all are looking for some sort of...analysis that will say 'If you see this: *then this*', and I don't think it exists."²⁷⁷

Role of Contractors

(U//) Contractors, primarily interpreter/linguists, EPMs, and LEPs, are instrumental to SFA-AT efforts. Field Service Representatives (FSR) also are vital to maintenance of critical equipment.²⁷⁸

(U//) Interpreters for the HHQ SFA-ATs are managed by RC (SW); all others are managed by the BSOs.²⁷⁹ Capable, trustworthy interpreters play a crucial role and fall into four general categories: locally hired nationals, Category I—U.S. citizen or resident alien (Category IP interpreters have been security screened), Category II—U.S. citizen with Secret clearance, and Category III—U.S. citizen with Top Secret clearance.²⁸⁰ Advisor teams at the provincial level typically have assigned a single Category I and multiple locally hired interpreters.

(U//) An important measure of interpreter effectiveness and suitability is the capacity to be accepted and establish rapport with ANSF counterparts. Interpreters are generally young and often fail to show ANSF leaders the requisite deference and respect.²⁸¹ () observed that local national interpreters are often more effective than foreign or ex-patriot Category I-II interpreters due to their cultural sensitivity and situational awareness.^{282 283}

(U//) Two senior interviewees agreed that although EPMs serve admirably, a more senior advisor with broader experience managing large enterprise-wide police organizations is required to mentor the Helmand Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP).^{284 285} () C10's AUP Lead, observed that what's required is "a Senior Police Advisor to sit alongside the PCOP...and assist him...both in terms of operations and...institutions and development."²⁸⁶

(U//[REDACTED]) Most EPMs are [REDACTED] employees with a minimum of eight years of law enforcement experience including investigation and patrol and/or police station operations. The EPMs also complete a two week pass/fail program that includes a psychological evaluation of suitability.²⁸⁷

(U//[REDACTED]) EPMs generally advise on evidence-based operations (EBO) (i.e., investigative efforts to collect evidence to build a case) while LEPs lean toward tactical site exploitation (i.e., gathering evidence from tactical operations or events).²⁸⁸

(U//[REDACTED]) [REDACTED] an EMP with the Helmand PPAT, emphasized the continuity of effort often represented by EPMs who may remain with a single ANSF unit for 2-3 years and suggested that the best opportunity for EPM introduction to SFA-AT senior leadership is during PDSS when and if conducted.²⁸⁹

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]







SFA-ATS IN AFGHANISTAN

- [illegible]

[REDACTED]





[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]